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Smart Charge · 17 April 2025 · 1 hr 5 min

Ep. 10: Mut zur Mobilitätswende – Prof. Andreas Knie über E‑Mobilität, Car‑Sharing & den langen Atem des Fortschritts

Transcript

Cleaned up from a machine transcript. Translations are machine-generated and may contain errors.

Welcome to the Smart Charge by RiDERgy Podcast. This is Claudio Geyken, Founder and CEO of RiDERgy. This is your show to learn about all things energy management and smart charging innovation for electric vehicles and fleets.

Today I'm speaking with Professor Andreas Knie. He is one of the leading experts in Germany when it comes to the topic of mobility transformation, electromobility and so on. He is passionate about various topics in this field and brings so much experience with him. It's incredible. He started in the academic environment, but he also founded something that is a bit lacking in Germany: these spin-offs, or academics who actually go on to found companies. And he also explains very well and in great detail why the German automotive industry, for example, hasn't been performing well lately.

And how it came to that, and the Chinese, and particularly also the history of California. I found this episode very enriching. Unfortunately, I have bad news: we had problems with the audio system, so the episode didn't work at times, towards the end. That's a bit unfortunate. He said a few nice things, which I'll summarize here again, things that were encouraging. In particular, he says he sees how progress has happened every day in the world, historically speaking.

That means you shouldn't get discouraged by the past, by what's happening, and by some of the confusion and errors you see nowadays. That was a very positive message. And he also encouraged the listeners to be brave, because courage pays off. I thought that statement was excellent. And he also has a new book. I would point everyone to that, and also to a very good website where you can really see everything – I would encourage everyone to take a look there. And if you

google him, it's easy to find. I also asked him a few questions here and there. But we'll then – we couldn't go into depth on certain topics the way I would have hoped. That means we'll certainly try to record a few more episodes with him in the future, and then we can make up for it. So, my apologies again. Thanks for your understanding, also to Professor Knie. And I hope he enjoys this episode. And if you have any aspects

that you'd like to explore further, please get in touch. And yes, I hope you've enjoyed the introduction so far. Enjoy the episode. See you soon. It's great to have you here today, Professor Knie. How are you doing today? Oh, the weather is nice today, everything is wonderful, Easter is just around the corner – things really couldn't be better. Yes, I'm with you on that. These spring moments in Berlin bring real joy. Yes, before we dive into the mobility topics we really have plenty of – your expertise is really quite

broad – could you perhaps give the listeners a brief introduction, but by all means take your time: how would you introduce yourself, what is your background, and how did you become the person you are today? Yes. My name is Andreas Knie. I studied political science in Marburg and Berlin, and then completed my doctorate on motors – diesel engines and Wankel engines. So I came to the car through studying motors and I actually started in the mid-1990s

thinking with many colleagues: what happens if we have more and more cars? What then happens to society? And how can we get control of this huge fleet again, so to speak? And since we in the social sciences only have the book and the spoken word, we quickly realized that we become more effective if we build our own companies and our own products. And then at the end of the 1990s we founded the first company:

the Company for Highly Organized City Traffic Elements, called Choice for short, with Audi AG, with Berliner Stadtauto, which existed back then, a carsharing company, and the BVG, and we already built our own products – leasing products – to check: how capable of change are people really? What year was that? We're now in 1998, you have to imagine. There was already the internet, but no mobile communications in that sense. There were already the first mobile phones, but there was

no mobile internet yet. The smartphone didn't arrive in the world until 2007. We had mobile phones back then anyway, but not – yes, those were – BlackBerry came slowly, but wasn't active back then either. And anyway, with this Choice company we experimented a lot, tested people's capacity for change, but we always said: to build the complete offering as an alternative to the car, we of course need Deutsche Bahn AG. And then we

got Deutsche Bahn AG in 2001, so to speak. But they didn't enter the company, they bought the entire company – as an asset deal, including me. And since the end of 2001 I was Head of Department for intermodal offerings at Deutsche Bahn AG. I launched Call a Bike, developed flinkster, created the unified carsharing platform Touch and Travel, which was later abolished again. What was that? Check in, check out. We had that back then even without an iPhone, we had it with Motorola mobile phones, with

extra battery. And there were touchpoints everywhere. You still see them from time to time. Those are installations at train stations where you think: what is that? And back then you could check in with your mobile phone and then check out again. We did that from 2006, 2007, 2008. And then it was industrialised and set up as a proper product at Deutsche Bahn. But before it could really get started, Deutsche Bahn AG discontinued it again. And when I realised that large corporations don't really function properly, we then

again together with the WZB. I should also mention this: I spent my entire time at the Science Center Berlin for Social Research. From 1995 I was also a professor at the Technical University, and I still am today, but then with the founding of the Innovation Centre for Mobility and Societal Change in 2006, I brought together Deutsche Bahn, the Science Center, the German Aerospace Center and later also Siemens AG. And we then tried to set up new mobility systems from scratch. And since we were also lacking the surrounding infrastructure and electromobility was slowly coming into view, we then took over the site, which was somewhat fallow at the time. That is today's ERF. And we wrote a programme for the owner at the time, the current owner, saying that he should not rely on fossil fuels, not on nuclear power, but on renewables, and implement them directly as sector coupling in heating and especially in transport activities. And there we – it was founded in 2006 as NOZ, excuse me – it was founded in 2006 as NOZ and by 2009 we were

already on the site. From 2010 onwards, this site became the first test area or the first laboratory for applied integrated electromobility, you could say. And then I left in 2018 and now I'm back at the Science Center, to think fundamentally again: what good things have we created? What was good? What was successful? And where do we need to change course and recalibrate? And that's what we're working on right now. Yes, exciting. There are so many aspects we can now look at in detail. For one thing, just to

clarify: this first phase you mentioned – was that a startup in that sense, or how should one imagine it? This founding, what structure did it have? Exactly. Yes, there are by now – well, in the past you could distinguish between startup and spinoff. Spinoffs were immediate, direct results of scientific work. That was actually a spinoff, what we did. We had certain ideas at the WZB, then at the WZB and also at the TU there were certain things. And we then

implemented those. That's why it's simply an attempt at a double validation. Because what peers, the scientists say, is one thing, and getting a nice article published everywhere is wonderful. But whether the bridge then works, the car drives and the invoice later also comes out at the printer or now appears in the app, we still don't know. And that's why we have to do it. And to do that, we founded this company. And from the start it wasn't designed for big returns. And this

spinoff, which you did, that's a big topic in Germany: how do you manage to turn excellent research – applied research too, which exists at Fraunhofer and so on – into something better in Europe and Germany? The Americans show us how a bit. How do you look at the topic? You made it work successfully. What's missing? And what could be – what made you do it? And perhaps: what are other scientists missing, who could certainly do a lot of things too, so why aren't they doing it? Yes, your question already assumes the right thing, I would say, that we have a huge problem here, which we somehow keep pushing ahead of us. So especially in the social sciences, I've always – I would say for decades – asked in my lectures: can you imagine starting a company? It was like I was telling them about the moon or Mars: what, start a company? And entrepreneurship was already declining. It's now completely out of the picture. No, entrepreneur – I can't imagine it anymore. And that's problem number one in Germany, that we're also doing the wrong thing in startup funding. It's always like this: you have to already know if you're an entrepreneur. If you don't feel that in yourself, then you can't do it. So you always get the impression it's like some kind of revival movement. So if I don't feel anything in me right now about whether I want to become an entrepreneur, then I'll leave it. The fact that it's completely different, that you do it for pragmatic reasons sometimes, sometimes less, but you can do it well paid – that's already the wrong mindset. And then you only become an entrepreneur if you're somehow half-baked, if you're somehow not kosher, if you're somehow morally not upright. So we don't have any real pragmatic, sober approach to entrepreneurship itself. It's either mythologised or perverted, in any case not normalised. That's one thing. And then of course we have a huge science sector, but it only circles around itself. Science

that's focused on peers looking at science. But whether it then has any impact on society or not – that's a secondary question. And then we have the funding structures, which are also extremely bureaucratic and risk-averse. So if you want to do something new, you have to already know exactly what you're doing before you even start. But that contradicts the nature of innovation itself. Innovation means: you don't yet know exactly what will come out. You have ideas, you have hypotheses, but you try them out. And in that trial phase, you learn. But our funding structures don't allow for that learning phase.

also could do, why aren't they doing it? Yes, your question already assumes the right thing, I would say, that we have a huge problem here, which we somehow keep pushing ahead of us. So especially in the social sciences, I've always – I would say for decades – asked in my lectures: can you imagine starting a company? It was like I was telling them about the moon or Mars: what, start a company? And entrepreneurship was already something different. It's now completely out of the picture. No, entrepreneur – I can't imagine it anymore. And that's problem number one in Germany, that we're also doing the wrong thing in startup funding. It's always like this: you have to already know if you're an entrepreneur. If you don't feel that in yourself, then you can't do it. So you always get the impression it's like some kind of revival movement. So if I don't feel anything in me right now about whether I want to become an entrepreneur, then I'll leave it.

can't imagine myself doing that. And that is Germany's number one problem, that we also always do the wrong thing in startup funding. It's always like: you have to already know if you're an entrepreneur. If you don't feel that in yourself, then you can't do it. So you always get the impression it's like some kind of revival movement. So if I don't feel anything in me right now about whether I want to become an entrepreneur, then I'll leave it. The fact that it's completely different, that you do it for pragmatic reasons sometimes, sometimes less, but you can do it well paid – that's already the wrong mindset. And then you only become an entrepreneur if you're somehow half-baked, if you're somehow not kosher, if you're somehow morally not upright. So we don't have any real pragmatic, sober approach to entrepreneurship itself.

that it's completely different, that you do it for pragmatic reasons, sometimes more, sometimes less, but you can do it well paid – that's already the wrong way of thinking. And then you only become an entrepreneur if you're somehow half-baked, if you're somehow not quite right, if you're somehow morally not upright. So we have no real pragmatic, sober approach to entrepreneurship itself. It's either mythologised or perverted, in any case not normalised. That's one thing. And then of course we have a huge science sector that only circles around itself. Science

is currently excellent science in Germany. That's already amazing in itself. What excellent science is, is decided by science itself. And that's why they have no normative understanding. That and that is excellent science, but rather it is excellent science where the peers, the colleagues, say that is excellent science. And that's a construct that you certainly need. But you always need it with a network around it. And there's nothing objective that could prove it somehow. And we've basically made a

contract with society, that's what it's called, that we as a German state put a lot of money into science. Still a lot, a lot of money. And we expect a return from it. But that's not stipulated. So how high does the return have to be? How differentiated does it have to be? It's just an expectation, and it's not being fulfilled – not fulfilled at all in my view. The Max Planck Institutes occasionally get Nobel Prize winners. That still means that the Max Planck Institutes don't have to account for what they

actually do with the money. They do provide documentation of use, but how they do it, how they evaluate themselves, nobody outside the Max Planck Society knows. They collect the money once a year and then eventually deliver results. And we as a society hope it will work out fine. The large research facilities, the second major part, the Helmholtz Association, build apparatus – I'll say it quite disparagingly – that nobody needs anymore. Money without end is invested in accelerator rings that could be used better worldwide

Sharing would be a good option, but nobody looks into it more carefully either. Then come the Fraunhofer institutions, and they said: We have a great trick. We don't just have basic funding, but we also have funding where we have to prove ourselves on the market. But the fact that many programs, especially in the BMBF, are tailored just for Fraunhofer so they can fulfill this principle, nobody knows. And that we haven't had anything for decades that was as spectacular as the MP3 player,

that barely anyone notices either. We have something like – BioNTech and a few other pharmaceutical products are quite good examples still – but otherwise we're completely lacking in Germany, also in the IT industry, something where we can say: Yes, that's worthwhile with science. Because, as I said, academic science is exclusively oriented toward academic reputation. And that's why we can't get anything done in Germany, especially since we also have the wrong structure in our heads. We always think that at the top, reputation-bringing, is basic research. And then the knowledge flows

like a cascade downward. And at the very bottom is application. That's why in the pecking order, in the reputation structure, the universities – the universities of applied sciences, the former ones – are right at the bottom. So even a professor at a university of applied sciences is not a real professor. But in fact, we first have to go into application and then find out what basic research is actually needed. We have to flip that around. So we not only have no reasonable image of entrepreneurship. We have a completely

wrongly organized and structured science. And we simply don't have a culture of trial and error in Germany. We always have to have everything in structures. A good example is autonomous vehicles. We're getting nowhere – nowhere – because we have a general regulation. If you want to introduce autonomous vehicles into traffic, they have to be roughly seven times safer than the ones we already have, which aren't safe. And it has to be so safe that nothing can happen. And if nothing can happen,

then nothing happens either. And that's a problem. That's why we have no relevance anymore in Germany in all relevant areas of future technology fields, and increasingly less in Europe too. It's just not noticeable because we're still living off our existing assets. And I think it's super exciting, this perspective. To make it a bit more personal: How was it for you that you made the leap? – Well, a kind of friendly disinterest, I'd say. My academic career certainly didn't support it in any way

In sociology, entrepreneurship is not known – at most as an object that one researches. That was recognized too. But I once suggested presenting "The Making of Cölbike" at the German Sociological Association on a sociologists' day. Because I had done that as a seminar at TU – over 200 people wanted to know how it went back then with the bike-sharing. And then they said: No, no, we don't do that. So that was completely unthinkable. And that's why you have to

– that's called scientific entrepreneur or science entrepreneur. Of course we've surveyed them ourselves too. You always turn your own predicament into a virtue by saying: Okay, if I can't really make that work, then I'm a sociologist again and I research what doesn't work. And if you ask them in Germany, they all tell you: Don't do it. So in Germany you always have to decide immediately: Am I a scientist, or am I an entrepreneur? The in-between, that's not

Germany does not appreciate that. The times when we had a Linde, a Hugo Junkers – yes, people don't even know about them anymore. All these pioneers who made us so to speak, because they were scientists and entrepreneurs at the same time. We don't have them anymore. We practically have none left. Yes, that's a chapter in itself. And the history of the founding with Deutsche Bahn – could you point out once more that as an entrepreneur yourself, achieving a partnership with such large organizations is not trivial at all. Could you shed light on how that was? Yes, that's also – well, we decided back then: We need leverage. What good is a nice invention or, for example, a car-sharing platform. There was already car-sharing in Germany – so we're back in 1999/2000. But they were all isolated from each other. Everyone had their own system. Then there was the wonderful invention of what was called cross-use. If you were a member

in Kiel and wanted to drive in Berlin, you had to fill out about twenty sheets. Then you got an extra key, then you also had to go to the office, and then after a lot of effort you also got a car. Even back then we said: That can't be like this, we need to change that a bit. And it can't be a small firm again – back then we talked more of small businesses, startup wasn't such a big term yet. And that's why it was clear: We need leverage.

And then we took a long time until the railway actually found a corner in its enormous corporate structure where it said: You can try that here. And that was back then the fleet. So that was the part at the railway that knew about cars. The railway has almost thirty thousand cars in stock – not just as company cars, which the railway always has, but also for service and everything else the railway needs. And they were already interested in something like car-sharing. And then we

put together the program so that you had an integrated railway corporation that served the last and first mile, so that people could conveniently get to the train station not just by taxi or bus, but also by other means and especially get away from the train station again. That was the idea. And back then it was the time of Hartmut Mehdorn – also a real entrepreneur. He was a real strong character, I have to say. I also think it's far too unfair that he's criticized

again and again. He also pushed things through. Most importantly, he had decision-making authority, and he also told us, for example, about the Call Bike topic and immediately saw: This can't be profitable on its own. You can't build the Call Bike system from the revenue of usage fees. But we need it as an image carrier, we need it as visibility. He drew – we saw this – DB flags everywhere. And he wanted the DB logo everywhere. And

then he said: These are wonderful things with the bikes. They're everywhere in the city, and everywhere I see my logo. That was a good idea of his. And then he said: You just put that in your system. You make a lot of money in this fleet with the railway, with the cars, so you do it. And that was certainly tricky, but

in the end one must say it didn't work out, because after many irritations and also many successes – one can already state that, the car-sharing industry benefited enormously from it because there was meanwhile a unified, digitally structured platform – we had to realize that the railway does have something like a founding core. And that is rail transport. So at the railway you can only become something if you organize rail transport. And everything around it then, if there is crisis and war and whatever else, gets pushed to the margins

or rather shut down. That applied to the bikes, even more so to car-sharing. The railway can't do buses, the railway can't do anything but rail transport – you have to understand that. And that's why it's one of my insights why I'm back at WCB now. Since I've been back at WCB, the insight is: the integrated mobility service providers, as we always wanted and wished for – BMW, Daimler were supposed to become that too – those can't exist. They don't work because these corporations are ultimately simply structured in such a way that they can only do one thing. Yes, that's a very relevant topic. Just these days Free Now was sold to Lyft. Yes, I also think of Clever Shuttle as an example, where the railway was involved as a shareholder and partner and unfortunately was no longer supported. Maybe I can say this: The InnoZ also had then really – I don't want to say war. So I personally then also

got into a real pickle because ultimately such corporations can't only do one thing, they can also only appreciate loyalty, not innovation or thinking outside the box. That's formulated again and again, of course. You have great spaces, you've founded great labs to somehow do something. Suddenly the board has sneakers on, suddenly the board no longer has a tie. It looks so relaxed, but it's not, because only loyalty is appreciated. And InnoZ was already cheeky, said: Hey, something like you

in Germany did not appreciate it. The times when we had a Linde, a Hugo Junkers – yes, people don't even know about them anymore. All these pioneers who made us so to speak, because they were scientists and entrepreneurs at the same time. We don't have them anymore. We practically have none left. Yes, that's a chapter in itself. Since I've been back at WCB, the insight is: the integrated mobility service providers, as we always wanted and wished for – BMW, Daimler were supposed to become that too – those can't exist. They don't work because these corporations are ultimately simply structured in such a way that they can only do one thing.

at the end of the day we must say it didn't work out. Because after many irritations and also many successes – one can already state that, the car-sharing industry benefited enormously from it because there was meanwhile a unified, digitally structured platform – we had to realize that the railway does have something like a founding core. And that is rail transport. So at the railway you can only become something if you organize rail transport. And everything around it then, if there is crisis and war and whatever else, gets pushed to the margins or rather shut down.

now it works, it doesn't work. And the railway couldn't handle this criticism. They shut down the InOZ. The same thing happened with Clever Shuttle. Clever Shuttle took an independent entrepreneurial approach. That should have been done. The railway did it officially. The railway also invested a lot of money. But when it came to fruition and Clever Shuttle said: No, we won't be consolidated. We have our own compliance rules, the railway said: Sector of the Selters. And then the Clever Shuttle guys hesitated a bit more. And

boom, the railway decided: You're shut down. And then they were dead. Yes. And how do you view the topic of DB Mindbox, since we're already talking about the railway? There's also this innovation department there. Innovation department – that's already the right term. I – one of my pioneer works at the railway was that they were about to want to establish a Commissioner for Innovation. You can already tell from the wording that that won't work. The good thing about the Mindbox – we

had – is that they took over our office spaces. We were looking for an office space back then that was so fancy, similar to yours here. But it was even cooler back then. That was at the Jannowitz Bridge. We were looking for a place where you could really see, feel, sense the intermodality of transport. It's still there. Everything's still there and it still exists. The train station isn't bad, you can say that. But I would never want to have an office outside of a train station again. You're wonderfully connected. You feel

connected too. That's quite funny. We had the water. Now and then a seaplane would come by. We had all modes of transport with us – road of course too, underground – and the Mindbox is still in there. And it's still in there. But I don't want to offend my colleagues. The individual colleagues at the railway are all dedicated people. But the structure is systematically designed in such a way that nothing can come out of Deutsche Bahn AG because it gets ground down in the big wheels of structures,

of corporate nature, of little confidence. When we introduced Touch and Travel back then, for example, I said: You check in and then at some point you check out. And then they said to me: Yes, what about it? People want to know how much it costs, don't they? I say: You can roughly show them a price range. But maybe that's the trick and the good thing about this new offer – that you don't know – because you don't know it with your car either. If

I don't want to know how much my car really costs, then I don't know it either. And that couldn't get through at the railway. And the new sales system NVS didn't accept that either. And the NVS still exists today. It was already 20 years ago, the NVS. So the "New" is already balanced out, it's structured. The railway is standing in its own way. I certainly also took that on – such a good example – with Call a Bike.

We started in 2007. The first app – I think in the App Store, in the transport sector, I think only we were there. The first app for a transport activity was Call a Bike. And we had, I think, the impression that we could still talk to Steve Jobs personally. He was still alive back then. That was – that was an interaction with California, you can't imagine that today anymore. And then the colleagues did it. And we were proud of it because we had that stationary registration process – for our young viewers

and listeners maybe once more: back then you didn't have a smartphone, well, you did, didn't know how it worked. You still had stationary devices. You had your laptop, you could fill out your registration forms at home. You had time. And the fact that you can now take the internet with you, transfer it into the public space, but as a result I have to reduce myself even more. And we took exactly this complexity that the railway always demanded – I don't know, 45 items – and put it into an app, with

the result that we collected awards like nothing else. And then I find out way too late: I say, I think your app is great. And then you realize: But nobody used it, or nobody completed this process all the way through. Way too complicated. We had to switch. The new media have new challenges. They have new opportunities, but need to be handled differently. And the railway still hasn't understood this process today – that an app is a completely different thing,

can do wonderful things, but doesn't need other things. And that's missing from a corporation – this flexibility is missing from this corporation. And then on the topic of electromobility: You said it somehow emerged. How exactly did you focus on e-mobility? Well, since I had already dealt with engines, I naturally also looked around the turn of the century: Why did the combustion engine actually come about? And why didn't all the others, which were much more widespread – electromobility, steam vehicles existed – why

then? That's an interesting question. The electric motor was, I think, in the emerging years – it was much earlier. In 1870 there was practically not much different status than we have today. So they all already worked wonderfully. Electricity was the medium of the future back then. Everyone who was modern had electricity. Electricity was the aura of the modern. And then these noisy rattletraps came. They weren't just loud, but they also stank. And

There was only trouble with the early vehicles. There's the legendary journey of Bertha Benz. And people kept writing about it and the surrounding circumstances. Those were also pioneering trips. But it didn't really get much attention. So people weren't waiting for these cars. And they didn't really have any purpose either. Nobody knew what to do with them. And then the great, the beautiful and the rich took possession of these cars and above all made long-distance trips with them and endurance drives. Rallies, as you'd say today. And for that

you need, so to speak, long-distance qualities. And of course liquid hydrocarbons had a higher energy density. And it was relatively quickly apparent that you could get further with them. Those were lead batteries back then. It was classic: 20 kilometres, so 30, 40 was already the limit. And in winter, as we know to this day, that was really quite bad. But the sputtering vehicles really did have the first pioneers who took up this thing. For example, people who made these long-distance trips. They

also told the engineers how they wanted the car to be a bit different. Those were carriages without horses. Then the centre of gravity was lowered. Then gradually a certain quality was developed, while the electric drives were still being built into carriages. So they practically couldn't experience this technology boost through rally applications at all. And so there was an unequal development. The electric vehicles got a bit stuck, and the internal combustion vehicles just kept getting better. There's the famous Herr Jelinek. He was a

cosmopolitan living in Nice, as you might say, very wealthy. And he also helped organise these races and above all told the Daimler people how to build a proper car. And the first proper vehicle was then in 1902, also an internal combustion engine vehicle, which had equally large wheels and looked most similar to a car today. And he named it right after his daughter, namely Mercedes. The electric vehicles didn't make this push. And when the electric starter was then invented

a few years later, then it was just a button press to get the vehicles going. Before that you had to do it with a crank. It was so cumbersome that women basically couldn't do it unless they happened to have a man or a strong guy with them who could do it. And once that happened, the breakthrough couldn't be stopped. When was that? It was really just before the First World War. And then it really took off after

the First World War. There was then about 40 years of coexistence. From around 1870, you could say, until 1988, there was coexistence. Even in terms of numbers. The electric car - the fire department, for example, of course only drove with electric vehicles, because no fire department could imagine driving around with - they were still called explosion engines back then - with petrol. That was unthinkable. And you can still see that today in Berlin if you go to Oberschöneweide and

go to the HTW. And across the way there's still the great building by Peter Behrens, one of the greatest industrial designers we had in Germany. He designed a corresponding building for the NAG, the National Automobile Company. And there the NAG, as well as Siemens, ultimately built electric cars until 1940. So they never completely disappeared. The internal combustion engine was then always more dominant. The electric cars ran very strongly in operational uses. There were the famous milk wagons, the fire departments and many

municipal companies still had electric cars. So they were never completely gone. But attention was always directed at the internal combustion vehicles. But at some point they were gone, right? Yes, so after the Second World War there was quite a slump with electric drives, also worldwide - so in the 50s, 60s. That wasn't a good time for electric vehicles. They only came back in 1973. Also for our young listeners: There was the Yom Kippur War. Israel was really attacked for the first time

and of course fought back accordingly. And as a countermeasure, the Arab states started to restrict the oil tap, with the result that this oil, which had practically never cost anything before, suddenly had a relevant price. And here in the West, the world came to an end. So no more oil - crisis. We immediately panicked. There were the very famous four car-free Sundays. I experienced that. I could suddenly train on motorways. You could play football. So that

was certainly an event, but it was clear: with the internal combustion engine you're already hitting limits, and dependence on oil is extremely high. We practically had 70 to 80 percent of imports from Arab countries. OPEC suddenly became a relevant actor. And then the search for alternatives began. And suddenly the electric motor was an option again. From then on, companies also started to set up research departments again and look into it. The Stirling engine was interesting. Hydrogen was of course also

on the table again. But people started operating with electric vehicles again. But it was only then. So I'm clearly not so deep into the history of electric mobility, I notice. But it's extremely exciting. If you then also have references to books or how to read up on it further, that would also be interesting. However, yes, it came in the 90s. There was the famous story "Who Killed the Electric Car" by GM, the EV1, I think, before Tesla

anyway. That was, I think, one of the biggest efforts to bring electric mobility back to life. But perhaps, I don't know, roughly between the 70s and, I think, the end of the 90s back then. Yes, it actually started earlier. In '73, as I said, it suddenly came back. It was triggered by the oil crisis – or actually an oil price crisis – it came back into people's consciousness for the first time. There were also first prototypes again. You saw cars with electric batteries again. But that was more half-thought than

actually done. And then we're slowly moving into the 80s. And in the 80s, the topic of the environment started to play a role, especially coming from California, because in California – or let's say, Los Angeles – it's located in a basin. And depending on the weather situation, the corresponding emission values are so bad. No one talked about climate change back then, it was simply the relevant smog issues. People first recognized that lead in petrol was problematic. You need that

to create the, so to speak, quality of petrol. So lead was basically a booster for the performance of petrol. That had to be removed. That happened in California already in the 60s. And in the 70s – while we had the oil price crisis – it was already starting in California: too many cars, the ever-increasing number of cars creates a problem. And by the 80s at the latest, it was on the agenda. And then California announced the Zero Emission Vehicle mandate for 1998 for the first time. And that has a

background story, because CARB, the California Air Resources Board – they're not, well. They're not stupid people, but they look at it: What could the industry actually do? So they don't just start saying, we're now imposing these and those emission values on you. They look. And there was a famous Roger Smith, known from the documentary "Roger and Me". Roger Smith was the CEO of GM. And the GM engineers had also already said, well, electric cars, we could do that too. And

they did. And then Roger Smith eventually told the Californians: Listen, guys, electric cars, we've got that completely under control. We can do that too. And then they said: Okay, okay, so we'll make that mandatory for you now. And then he said: You don't want to force us to build this car, do you. Yes, we do, they said. And that's how the EV1 came about – it was first called "Compact" – the EV1 was built in, I'd say, 470 units. A

Flounder, a flat flounder. That actually came into use in the 90s. And that was the hit, especially for celebrities. So everyone who was anyone in California had one of these EV1s. There was also for the first time something like a blog post, which was also really publicized on the internet for the first time. And GM was forced to build it to show: we could also meet these emission values. But that didn't work for various reasons. There wasn't the

infrastructure. The cars didn't have the right qualities yet. Range was the problem. And then the pressure from the other manufacturers kept growing, so California weakened this Zero Emission Vehicles regulation more and more – to this day never implemented it in the quality it was supposed to have back in 1998. Because with that '98 rule, starting from 2008, there would have been practically hardly any emissions from cars anymore. So that was radical thinking. So, but since then the car was there, the idea was there. And

then there was also for a long time kind of quiet. And I was also very

surprised when we founded Innocentive in 2006 – so from 2007 suddenly the topic of electric cars, electromobility started to explode. Against Tesla? Tesla wasn't even there yet. Tesla wasn't even a relevant player, rather electromobility was primarily fueled by the energy sector, which suddenly also had great interest. Energy suppliers wanted to do something. Car manufacturers also had ideas with California in mind. And relatively soon – at the latest since 2008, 2009 – China became an important player. Because the head of there, what you'd call the Senate in Berlin – Professor Wan Gang, a good friend of mine. He was an Audi engineer and had worked at Audi, did his doctorate in Clausthal-Zellerfeld, was happy, had his little house in Ingolstadt, sat there and had already thought, I'll grow old here – until a Chinese, I think even the Prime Minister, came by Audi one time. And then he told him: listen, if I had any say in China, I would do it this and that way. I wouldn't bet on combustion engines at all. I would sort of make a leapfrog. I would go straight into electromobility. And then they said: well, if you're going to sound off and spit and tell us all about it, then you should go there. And so they put together a wonderful program. And then he went to Tongji University in Shanghai – first as a professor, then as head of Tongji – and at that time he set up the famous electromobility promotion program. And I can still see it somehow – I see myself there. I had visited him. We had a close

relationship.

on combustion engines. I would, so to speak, make a leapfrog. I would go straight into electromobility. And then they said: yes, if you sound off like that here and spit and tell stories, then you come there. And then they made a wonderful program. And then he went to Tongji University in Shanghai – first as a professor, then as head of Tongji – and at that time set up the famous electromobility promotion program. And I can somehow still see it – I see myself there. I had visited him. We had a close

Contact. And then suddenly I'm watching the evening news. He even became a minister. He was quite an important minister, namely for science and research, but with his reputation he was able to really establish this program, and then in 2008, 2009 he practically invited the world, to China, to Shanghai especially, to present the program and to say: "Listen up, people, we're betting on electric mobility for environmental reasons, but above all for industrial policy reasons, but we're offering you partnerships. But you need to know, we will do everything to make sure that"

combustion engines get restrictions, even more than we already have. And we will promote electric mobility. We will also lift registration restrictions. Everything." And the German automotive industry just laughed. They said: "People, that's completely the wrong way. Build diesel engines. They're much more efficient. You can't pull it off with these electric cars." And that was the biggest mistake of the German automotive industry. The Americans and the Japanese kept a very low profile. Japan and China, well, that's such a difficult relationship anyway. And the Americans, pragmatic as they are:

Well, then we'll do something else. We're not attached to this technology." The Germans clung to this technology and – yes, we're seeing the results now. Meanwhile VW had 70 percent market share, now at, I don't know, below 4 percent. At one point almost 60 percent of the entire output of the German automotive industry – of the entire automotive industry – went to China, is now declining. And the German automotive industry is now shrinking and possibly won't survive in its current form. And that was 2008. And then only slowly came Tesla, suddenly sort of quietly

drifting through. And you have to say this, despite – a few irritations about Elon Musk – they have shown that what everyone was already worried about is indeed the case. You can, so to speak, from scratch very quickly – you could say, from the internet – build a car in high quality, which in some respects even surpasses the quality standards of the Germans, and manages to position itself at the top of electric mobility within 10, 15 years. Of course, this has caused deep,

deep, a profound sorrow in the German soul, so to speak the engineer's soul, right up to today. Yes, very exciting. And how do you view the BMW i3 topic? Because in my view that's one of the first vehicles from the Germans that was actually well thought out. You had the feeling that the Germans were taking it seriously, the topic of e-mobility and sustainability. And then it was neglected as a project for a long time anyway. That was 2011, right, if I'm not mistaken? Yes, yes. The i3 was developed relatively

soon also in place. That was the Project X, so to speak, internally. So they had – BMW apparently got inspired back then, we suspect, by the owner family Quandt – to say: "Okay, we have to go beyond the classical combustion engine lines." The Bavarian Motor Works are not only called Bavarian Motor Works, but are also Bavarian internal combustion engine works. So they had the best diesels, the best – BMW was very proud back then of having the best combustion engines. And that's why they had to keep this electric drive somewhat off to the side. They brought in Uli Kranz as a project manager, a really

really clever engineer. And there was also a patron in the board. And then they really designed a completely new car, above all one that not only had a different engine, but also the materials that were used. That was precisely the first – or not the first, but a car designed around lightweight construction, because they realized: you can't just swap the engine, you also have to more or less abandon the automobile construction philosophy you knew. And they did pioneering work, but then lost their nerve, because

of course this car was very expensive. That's where the first problem started – I mean, BMW has many large cars, the 7 Series and other products that are to this day heavily cross-subsidized, because that's what they want. That goes with the territory. The 12-cylinder engines in the 7 Series, which fortunately no longer exist – highly loss-making engines that consumed huge development capacity and sold nothing really. But with the i3, they didn't want to do that anymore or couldn't do it anymore. They could have brought the car to market for 35,000 euros,

and it would have sold like hotcakes. If you wanted a steering wheel included as well, it was almost 50,000. Only a few pioneers could afford that. That was cowardice number one. And cowardice number two was that they didn't stick with this technology offensive long enough, because they realized the others weren't following. The creed in German automotive manufacturing is: success is when it gets copied. I mean, if the others copy it, then it's good, because then I can make higher volumes,

I get scaling effects. And that wasn't the case with the i3. They didn't engage with this offensive. The others kept building the way they always had. "Well, we'll make it through on our own anyway." And that's why BMW essentially abandoned the i3 after three or four years and then said: "Okay, we'll build this bit of electromobility into the line, here on the left combustion engines, on the right electric, and we'll manage that." And that's what they've done now and in the meantime are also quite successful with this strategy, you have to

also say it. They're still selling the most electric cars at the moment. But it wasn't a bold path. And the bold path that existed at some point wasn't pursued further. And the future, I assume: even if they had diesel as core expertise, their research is already on the electric motor in their eyes, right? So we have that. There was then the National Platform for Electromobility, where I also had the pleasure of participating. That was really a real departure into a new form where

science, business, electromobility, so electrical engineering and automotive engineering came together. And we definitely did that there. Always considered: is it really the better alternative? And I don't know how many studies Daimler, BMW, Volkswagen, the Federal Environment Agency, all the eco-institutes – everything that crawls and flies – have done. And they are unanimous. Worldwide, you can sum them up with one simple sentence: if you're going to have a car at all, then a battery-electric car. It's still a bit better and it's getting better too. And what impresses me is that we had

the figures back then, especially in battery development – quality, price-to-performance ratio – they actually turned out exactly as predicted. And we said back then that battery-electric vehicles would be for cars, and eventually hydrogen with fuel cells would come for heavy-duty vehicles and also for long-distance vehicles. You couldn't sign off on that today. Today you can make everything battery-electric. We have the new – CATL announced the new battery generation. And when they announce something, it's usually right. There are

ranges on the way that really make your ears perk up, at prices you can afford. And that's why I know: from all the heavy-duty providers, many are now betting on battery-electric heavy-duty transport. Yes, that's going to be exciting. Looking back once more at InnoZ and that time: what are some exciting electromobility projects you did there that you'd want to highlight? Well, we basically did everything back then that people are still dreaming about today. So first of all – that was the first thing. We

said that electromobility had to go into the sharing business. Because you have to – the cars that were already a bit more expensive and still are – you don't have to buy them, you can share them. Of course you need appropriate platforms and business models for that. We managed all of that. So we achieved the electrification of the carsharing fleet through appropriate adjustments to the booking system too. For the first time we could also flag fleet vehicles separately, so to speak: you could see the parameters for mileage, you could see the battery performance parameters. Which car is being

borrowed, what state of charge is possible. So it wasn't called smart charging back then, but we already had that. That was the first thing. And the second thing was immediately clear: it had to be bidirectional. And we had five Mini E as prototypes on offer. And we operated them bidirectionally. I thought that would be witchcraft – it's quite simple. It wasn't like that from the start, no. But BMW had to agree to it. They said we could do it for the five vehicles. But

otherwise the battery is the most expensive thing on the car, and we're not letting any external utility, grid operator or any service provider charge or discharge the battery. We do that ourselves. But for the five vehicles we could do it. And then we did it beautifully and were able to power a little corner – the ARD Plusminus, the talk show that was just starting then from Jauch on Sunday evenings from the Gasometer – with electricity from our PV system and our small wind turbine that we'd also set up there

was then sort of equipped. That was our proof of concept, so to speak. We said: this is our aluminium smelter, because we were always accused of: well, an office building like that, anyone can supply that, that's nothing. But if you had an aluminium smelter, or if you had real heavy industry that needs electricity. And then we said: okay, let's do it. So when the talk show turned on its lights on Sunday afternoon, the power demand went up. And we managed that beautifully through our little micro-smart-grid. That

all worked perfectly technically – and bidirectionally

technically, so it works. It's quite simple. You need appropriate battery capacities, and we had those. Of course we didn't just have the cars, the five Minis – we had a large lead battery, but the devil was in the details there too: when it had to be controlled, it came into action too slowly, so to speak. It needed, I think, three-tenths of a second, and it always took a second to ramp up. And then we always had immediate grid consumption right away.

Then it went straight zap into the grid. And so we often didn't make use of this self-sufficiency option because the batteries took too long. So you just need appropriate storage – you could do that much better today. You need appropriate controls, and then that's all there is to it. Electrical engineering is really quite simply structured when you get down to it. And all of that worked beautifully, as I said. Although of course we ultimately didn't put prices on it. So those were all R&D projects. They had to

they also could not be activated, they could be written off, they could be booked as expenses. We already had that. So, to then secure it legally and operationally speaking. We never got that far. Because in the meantime the production company discovered it and said: You can't do that. You can't organize something for an ARD live broadcast with amateur electricity. Then they shut us down. And then, six weeks later, Vattenfall had a huge problem with some transformer. And then they were with their

live broadcast in the dark. They couldn't broadcast. And I got so many emails and so many SMS messages. See, how far you get with your amateur setup. You idiot: heart surgery, that doesn't work at all. And I thought: It worked for us. This is now the standard project that didn't work. So that was wonderful. And then we also did something that isn't really in fashion today, but will come, namely inductive

charging. So I was driving around with my cables and my electric cars back then. And actually, I still don't want to do that today. Cables are just terrible. Let's not fool ourselves. Until they finally get the right charging infrastructure in place, until they have the proper card access – that's still not convenient today, I have to say. And much better is: You park the car and get out. And you don't have to worry about anything. So there's nothing better than inductive charging. But there too, the

problem is in the details. You have to park the car correctly. And of course you don't have the charging power you get with cable-based charging. But it worked, we did that too. And a project that emerged is Mobility to Grid. How did that come about? Maybe you know a couple too. Yes, we always needed research funding. The companies came quite interested. And the business model at Indoz was like this, or Home Ore: You can – you need – you have your own charging station. You have your own charging cable. You have your own

wind turbine. You have your own PV system. You can demonstrate on this site, but you have to become a tenant. So Reinhard Müller benefited a lot from that. From this idea, he quickly brought his tenants together. And we always did services with them. We also simply profited from it. But they can't really finance it unless they also get public funding through projects. And we have a research format that we proposed before, namely the Research Campus, where you collaborate with business and science at one location,

so that you solve the problems we just discussed, the structural problems, by working closely together at least spatially. We applied and also got funding, which continues to this day. And it means nothing other than trying to integrate all kinds of electric drives and vehicle types into a micro smart grid, to balance out the volatility of power generation and of course create something like sector coupling – without a heat component. We didn't have that back then. We don't have it today either.

And that continues, as I said, to this day. And when it comes to your vision for mobility in the future, let us speculate a bit. What would be a future vision for you where Germany, and generally the world, would be a better place in terms of sustainable mobility? Well, I'd say less is more. This whole nervous globalization is something we should really think hard about again. What really needs to be globalized? And what should rather not be globalized? I don't need strawberries in winter. I also don't need

Australian beer that comes by plane. And I don't need roses that come from Africa. So a lot of globalization is simply unnecessary. There are things you can't prevent. You shouldn't prevent them either. That's the first thing. The second thing is: We should think very carefully about what we actually need to do with an automobile. The automobile is not simply a means to an end, but the automobile has seduced us into doing things we never had under control. The car has essentially suspended space and

time for us. Time was no longer an issue. Space was no longer an issue. And so we drove out of our actual social cohesion with the car and, at the end of the day, destroyed society more than we brought it together. Previously everyone drove somewhere in one car. That supported families. Today everyone drives away in their own car and the family is torn apart. There's a correlation between divorce rates and the number of registered vehicles. So less is more in that case, so actually

less driving. And the third thing is: What equipment really must be used shouldn't be owned as property, but use instead of ownership – access, as Jeremy Rifkin wrote about twenty years ago. And the equipment of course must also be battery electric, integrated into an appropriate decentralized energy supply structure. But that doesn't drive itself anymore either, of course. So those are the robotaxis, of course. Those are the vehicles I call up via app, they come, they take me where I want to go, and then park somewhere

a depot or somewhere, and at the same time have a quick charger available. All the technical components are there. All the ingredients are available, even in Germany. What's lacking is the courage to simply do it and find a city that takes it on boldly. Yes, and speaking of courage and a city that takes it on. That's something I noticed. I lived in Barcelona. Next week I'm in Paris and I live in Berlin. And I've seen the Superblocks in Barcelona. If that means anything to you, this project, they had very ambitious visions that they're now implementing rigorously according to a plan, where there's greening and streets are restructured, like Friedrichstraße here in Berlin. Except in Friedrichstraße it was only temporary, and there it's really permanent. And Paris is also being made very car-free right now, which of course is much more pleasant for the local population. And I think that's a future vision that one would

like to have. What's missing in Berlin, for example, that it's not simply implemented more in that direction? Well, it gets even worse. Before I answer that: the tourism authority here, Visit Berlin, also asked me, we need spectacular actions. Because what are the tourist destinations? What are the magnets, why do people go there? For example, Park Lane in New York is now number one. And in Paris, people are now going to finally see what

are the streets like without cars? They're not all without cars. But it's enough that people go there. Copenhagen has experienced an incredible boom in tourist visitors since it became known that they're so focused on bicycles. And tourist visitors are business. And we have nothing anymore. We had five hundred meters of Friedrichstraße that was swept away, with the result that it's now so bad. The Lafayette closed – it was still open back then. But it looks

simply awful. You have to be very clear: the more cars, the worse everything becomes – not just the environmental issue, but the liveliness of the city, the vitality of the city. We're suffocating in metal, and apparently all other cities in the world have recognized that. The only city or the only country that hasn't recognized that is Germany. But I haven't given up hope. We have diversity in Berlin, also in politics. And above all, Berlin still works despite politics. We've never had to thank politics for anything, rather because people started it themselves. The pressure washer was invented in Berlin because the Peterson brothers simply did it. The unified ticket and the BVG – those were still municipal rule, those were still Reuter, those were still pioneering works. And the motorway construction too, that was progressive at the time. Nineteen fifties: we simply built motorways everywhere. Those were progressive ideas back then. Today, however, we need to see that all of that is from yesterday and that we need exactly these answers for

tomorrow. We simply need different neighborhoods. Space needs to be divided differently. We simply need more green. We need more resilience in the infrastructure, quite simply because we can't survive in this heat. We're already experiencing dry periods again. We're already experiencing poor air quality again. If we don't get more green into this city, if we don't get more infiltration structures so that we have more water storage, if we don't have more quality of stay so that people come back out and do something again

in public space – for example, shopping, going to bars – so that we have a livable environment, then we'll go under here. And we can only manage that if we push the cars back to where they came from, namely from private garages, from private car parks. Parking private cars on public streets can't happen anymore. So restrict parking space now, increase prices drastically. And then people need to go to spaces that are private in nature. Public space must be freed up for other things.

We're renovating something on every corner. Commercial vehicles need to go there, and they can't park in the second row. We can't allow it anymore – as happened last week in Berlin – that a fire department operation failed because someone was parked illegally in front of the fire station entrance. It's incredible what we allow ourselves to do here. But I'm quite confident that this is slowly coming. If the CDU already has to justify it in the coalition agreement, saying we make a commitment to the car – well, if I have to make a commitment to something, then

it's no longer self-evident. But if it's no longer self-evident, then I can debate it politically, and now we're starting there. And since the pandemic we've realized we have a lifestyle that's too distance-intensive. We can do it more simply too. We now see in the statistics: we're actually already driving less. The car has less mileage. The share of trips has also decreased, and we could cycle much more. Still, ninety-two percent of all trips by car are under ten kilometers. So, we

are renovating on every corner. Commercial vehicles need to go there, and they can't park in the second row. We can't allow it anymore – like last week in Berlin – a fire department operation failed because someone was illegally parked in front of the fire station entrance. It's incredible what we tolerate here. But I'm quite confident this is slowly changing. If the CDU already has to justify it in the coalition agreement by saying we're making a commitment to cars – well, if I have to make a commitment to something, then

it's not taken for granted anymore. But if it's not taken for granted anymore, then I can debate it politically, and now we're starting to do that. And since the pandemic we've realized we have a lifestyle that's too distance-intensive. We can also do it more simply. We're now seeing in the statistics: we're actually already driving less. The car has less driving performance. The share of trips has also decreased, and we could cycle much more. Still, ninety-two percent of all trips by car are under ten kilometers. So we

could do much more. And Berlin needs to recognize that now. And I'm optimistic that the senators, including the Governing Mayor, will recognize that and that we're slowly getting there – maybe the CDU needs to find its own style in how it does it. Of course, they shouldn't do it the way the Greens would do it. Maybe the CDU finds its own technical style to do it, but we can't avoid it. Yes, what surprises me – because I don't know if you've thought about it and would have an answer

to that. But to put it in a bigger context as well: the issue that the Germans really stand out clearly in this case because they're going against the trend or not following this trend like other major cities – Berlin also takes up the topic of innovation. That maybe others – we mentioned the Chinese, but also the pragmatism of the Americans – that in other cultures it's the innovation capability of the culture. What is it, what makes it – can you do something better? If you now think about it in a positive and constructive way, to make Germany a bit braver and a bit more pragmatic and move more in that direction. Yes, so "turning point" is the right term, but describing the wrong thing from what the still-Chancellor said.

Fascinating what Professor Knie told us all. He has an incredible background – a sociologist who then became an entrepreneur through a spin-off, made a deal with Deutsche Bahn and then started so many new initiatives that maybe some of you have already used, like Call a Bike etc. You really notice how passionate he is about these topics and how frustrated he gets with how timidly things are sometimes tackled in Germany. And he has clear visions: autonomous driving, electric

mobility – he was really well informed about that. As for the history: he did a lot of research on diesel, but was really well informed about it. And it was also fascinating to learn how the e-mobility history unfolded – that e-vehicles actually coexisted for so long, back in the 19th century, and then eventually only combustion engines remained. And then 1973, how change came again, California's role, so many ups and downs, why things happen or don't, geopolitically

and the differences we then had between different countries – and why the Germans are the way they are and what one could do about it. It really gave me courage too. One of the sentences he made I found particularly fascinating: that you're simply always rewarded for courage. And in that sense: what can we do every day to be brave? I think with the closing remarks – yes, maybe listening to a podcast where you also get encouraged is one thing – and then really getting into action

and making the world a little bit better. If you like that and this spirit, then feel free to subscribe and share the episode with people you think might like it. Yes, we'll talk next time.

could do much more. And Berlin needs to recognize that now. And I'm optimistic that the senators, including the Governing Mayor, will recognize that and that we're slowly getting there – maybe the CDU needs to find its own style in how it does it. Of course, they shouldn't do it the way the Greens would do it. Maybe the CDU finds its own technical style to do it, but we can't avoid it. Yes, what surprises me – because I don't know if you've thought about it and would have an answer to that.

Episode notes

In dieser inspirierenden Episode treffen wir Prof. Andreas Knie – Soziologe, Seriengründer und Pionier der deutschen Sharing‑Economy. Er erzählt, wie aus universitärer Forschung ein Startup wurde, das mit der Deutschen Bahn Call‑a‑Bike & Co. zum Leben erweckte. Mit viel Leidenschaft blickt Knie auf die Meilensteine und Sackgassen der Mobilitätsgeschichte: von der Koexistenz elektrischer und verbrennungsmotorischer Fahrzeuge im 19. Jahrhundert über die Ölkrise 1973 bis hin zu Kaliforniens Vorreiterrolle beim Comeback der E‑Autos. Prof. Knie nimmt kein Blatt vor den Mund, wenn es um Deutschlands Mutlosigkeit geht – und liefert gleichzeitig greifbare Visionen: autonomes Fahren, konsequent elektrische Flotten und eine Infrastruktur, die Wandel zulässt statt verhindert. Geopolitische Stolpersteine, transatlantische Unterschiede und die Frage, warum deutsche Ingenieurskunst manchmal am eigenen Perfektionismus scheitert, kommen ebenso zur Sprache wie das Credo des Gasts: Mut wird immer belohnt. Hört rein, lasst euch motivieren und findet heraus, was jede:r von uns täglich tun kann, um die Mobilitätswende voranzutreiben. Wenn euch dieser Spirit gefällt, abonniert den Podcast, gebt uns ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ und teilt die Folge mit allen, die neuen Schwung für ihre Zukunftsvision brauchen!